Post by account_disabled on Mar 11, 2024 22:17:38 GMT -6
The very intention of expanding the electoral fund to the detriment of sensitive areas such as health and education proved the risk of deconstructing the budgetary links that support social rights. This is an emblematic demonstration of how quickly and voraciously it can be emptied of the legitimate ordering of priorities included in budget planning to meet the short electoral deadline and generate greater fiscal physiology.
Falsely invoking the idea of an imposing budget what of its influence in municipal elections either directly in the increase in public funding for candidacies or indirectly in the form of transfers of imposing amendments under a prior planning regime. non-existent and flexible control.
Instead of effectively improving the federative pact the patrimonial approach to municipal budget execution has been disputed by the Executive and now more recently by the Legislature. This Phone Number Data is a pendulum movement that effectively shifts the weight of Brazilian coalition presidentialism as raised by Sérgio Abranches to a kind of parliamentary protagonism in retaliation against the Executive:
“The protagonism of the Legislature manifests itself more as a crisis than as a functional alternative. … Congress is divided by nature. It can only unite around lowest common denominators or after a lengthy construction of social and political consensus stimulated by the general conviction that there is an emergency.
… I don’t see how the Brazilian political model can transition from coalition presidentialism to voluntarist parliamentarism except in a dangerous process of institutional dissolution.”
Recalcitrant flaws rule out the thesis that the decision-making decentralization of the federal budget cycle in the form of authoritative parliamentary amendments individual or bench as well as committee amendments would be ontologically capable of democratizing its allocation. Quite the contrary the risk that is foreseen is that of private appropriation of the public interest because the planning that orders legitimate priorities has not been sufficiently strengthened nor have the control institutions that would attest to the effective achievement of the planned results at reasonable costs been qualitatively structured. .
Faced with the imminence of another new financial year in which municipal elections will take place it is necessary to renew caution with all these risks so that the country can learn from the mistakes of the past instead of just repeating them in an increasingly chronic way and aggravated.
In Brazilian society needs to try once again to overcome the coronelist treatment of the budget and ensure effectively democratic elections. It is not easy but perhaps now there is more clarity that democracy and the budget are two sides of the same coin and both can suffer the severe risk of abuse of political power.
Falsely invoking the idea of an imposing budget what of its influence in municipal elections either directly in the increase in public funding for candidacies or indirectly in the form of transfers of imposing amendments under a prior planning regime. non-existent and flexible control.
Instead of effectively improving the federative pact the patrimonial approach to municipal budget execution has been disputed by the Executive and now more recently by the Legislature. This Phone Number Data is a pendulum movement that effectively shifts the weight of Brazilian coalition presidentialism as raised by Sérgio Abranches to a kind of parliamentary protagonism in retaliation against the Executive:
“The protagonism of the Legislature manifests itself more as a crisis than as a functional alternative. … Congress is divided by nature. It can only unite around lowest common denominators or after a lengthy construction of social and political consensus stimulated by the general conviction that there is an emergency.
… I don’t see how the Brazilian political model can transition from coalition presidentialism to voluntarist parliamentarism except in a dangerous process of institutional dissolution.”
Recalcitrant flaws rule out the thesis that the decision-making decentralization of the federal budget cycle in the form of authoritative parliamentary amendments individual or bench as well as committee amendments would be ontologically capable of democratizing its allocation. Quite the contrary the risk that is foreseen is that of private appropriation of the public interest because the planning that orders legitimate priorities has not been sufficiently strengthened nor have the control institutions that would attest to the effective achievement of the planned results at reasonable costs been qualitatively structured. .
Faced with the imminence of another new financial year in which municipal elections will take place it is necessary to renew caution with all these risks so that the country can learn from the mistakes of the past instead of just repeating them in an increasingly chronic way and aggravated.
In Brazilian society needs to try once again to overcome the coronelist treatment of the budget and ensure effectively democratic elections. It is not easy but perhaps now there is more clarity that democracy and the budget are two sides of the same coin and both can suffer the severe risk of abuse of political power.